|
MALTREATMENT INVESTIGATION MEMORANDUM Minnesota Statutes, section 626.557, subdivision 1 states, “The legislature declares that the public policy of this state is to protect adults who, because of physical or mental disability or dependency on institutional services, are particularly vulnerable to maltreatment.”
License Number and Program Type: 1100371-HCBS (Home and Community-Based Services) Investigator(s): Scout Peterson 651-431-6578 Suspected Maltreatment Reported: It was reported that a staff person (SP) transferred money from two vulnerable adult’s (VA1 and VA2) shared bank account to his/her personal bank account on multiple occasions. Date of Incident(s): Ongoing from October 2023 through February 2024 Nature of Alleged Maltreatment Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, section 626.557, subdivision 9c, paragraph (b), and Minnesota Statutes, section 626.5572, subdivision 15, and subdivision 9, paragraph (b), clause (1): In the absence of legal authority a person willfully uses, withholds, or disposes of funds or property of a vulnerable adult. Summary of Findings: Pertinent information for this investigation was obtained remotely, including documentation from the facility and VA1’s and VA2’s guardian; and through three interviews conducted with VA1’s and VA2’s case manager (CM), the SP, and a supervisory staff person (P). Due to their diagnoses, VA1 and VA2 were unable to provide information for this investigation. VA1’s and VA2’s guardian who was also a family member (FM) was not able to participate in an interview but provided handwritten information which was included below. VA1 and VA2 were twin siblings who each had cerebral palsy and lived in a home owned by the FM. VA1 and VA2 each received 24-hour in-home support with training and night supervision from the license holder which will be referred to as facility throughout the report. VA1 and VA2 shared a bank account that the FM managed, and staff persons had access to a debit card for the account. VA1’s and VA2’s Individual Abuse Prevention Plans each stated that “[VA1/VA2 do] not handle any financials and [each] has limited understanding of money” and each “would not be able to recognize if [their] money was mismanaged.” According to the facility’s Client Funds Policy, “The staff of Northstar community services must not and will not […] use person supported funds in a manner that would violate their rights.” According to the FM and bank statements provided by the FM, on the following dates, money transfers were made from the VAs’ bank account to a Venmo account listing the SP’s name and totaled $1450 or $1550 ($250 or $350 was still unaccounted for and not repaid by the SP): · September 30, 2023, $100 (Posted date October 2, 2023) The FM wrote on the bank statement that the transfer was “possibly ok at bowling alley?” · October 19, 2023, $200 · October 25, 2023, $100 · On an unknown date in October 2023, the SP gave the FM $300 cash. · November 10, 2023, $100 · November 17, 2023, $100 · November 23, 2023, $100 (Posted date November 24, 2023) · December 7, 2023, $100 · December 9, 2023, $200 (Posted date December 11, 2023) · December 27, 2023, $200 · December 31, 2023, $250 (Posted January 2, 2024) · January 2, 2024, $100 · February 2, 2024, the SP deposited $300 into the account. · On an unknown date in March 2024, the SP gave the FM a money order for $600.
According to Venmo.com, the Venmo app is “intended only for payments between separate individuals rather than moving money between your own payment methods.” Users select to and from which account they are sending or receiving money. The FM provided a handwritten letter with the following information: · When the FM received the VAs’ October 2023 bank statement, s/he noticed three transfers from the VAs’ bank account to the SP’s Venmo account. · The FM and SP met monthly to review the VAs’ finances so when they met regarding the October 2023 statement, the SP told the FM that s/he meant to transfer money from one of his/her personal accounts to another personal account but “pushed the wrong button” on Venmo. The SP then gave the FM an envelope with $300 cash to repay the October 19 and October 25, 2023, transfers made by the SP. · When the FM received the VAs’ November 2023 bank statement, s/he again noticed three transfers from the VAs’ bank account to the SP’s Venmo account. When the SP and FM met regarding the November 2023 statement, the FM told the SP about the $300 transfers to the SP’s account and told the SP to stop using VA1’s and VA2’s bank account on his/her Venmo account. · When the FM received the VAs’ December 2023 bank statement, s/he saw three transfers from the VAs’ bank account to the SP’s Venmo account totaling $500. The SP told the FM that s/he would transfer $600 back into the VAs’ account but did not provide further explanation for the unauthorized transfers. · When the FM received the VAs’ January 2024 bank statement, s/he saw that the SP did not deposit the $600 as the SP previously stated s/he would and there were two more transfers from the VAs’ bank account to the SP’s Venmo account that totaled $300. · When the FM received the VAs’ February 2024 bank statement, there were no unauthorized transfers from the VAs’ account into the SP’s account, however, the SP transferred $300 into the VAs’ account. · After receiving the February 2024 statement, the FM met with the P and told him/her about the unauthorized transfers. After this, the SP sent the P a money order for $600 and the P then gave the money order to the FM. The CM stated that the FM tracked VA1’s and VA2’s finances. The FM had bank records from VA1’s and VA2’s bank account that showed there were unauthorized transfers out of the account, but the CM did not know the amount. Facility staff persons had access to a debit card to purchase items for VA1 and VA2. The P provided the following information: · On March 19, 2024, the P met with the FM who stated that s/he had “concerns” about withdrawals from VA1’s and VA2’s bank account which were deposited directly to the SP’s Venmo account. The FM provided information to the P that was consistent with the written information the FM provided this investigator. In addition, the FM told the P that on an unknown date, (later determined to be September 30, 2023), the SP took VA1 and VA2 bowling. The SP transferred money from VA1’s and VA2’s bank account to his/her Venmo account to use at the bowling alley. At this time, VA1’s and VA2’s banking information was saved in the SP’s Venmo app. · Later the same day, the P met with the SP who stated that the whole thing was a “misunderstanding.” The SP told the P that s/he had VA1’s and VA2’s bank account information on his/her Venmo app because s/he needed to add it to take out cash when s/he took VA1 and VA2 bowling. The SP told P that s/he “didn’t do anything wrong.” The SP provided the following information: · The SP worked with VA1 and VA2 for approximately nine years and was “pretty close” with the FM. VA1 and VA2 had a debit card that the FM stated staff persons could use for grocery shopping and activities. · On an unknown date in 2023, the SP took VA1 and VA2 bowling. At the bowling alley, there was a problem with the credit card machine and the bowling alley staff directed the SP to take cash out of the ATM to pay. The SP did not know the PIN number for VA1’s and VA2’s debit card so the SP put VA1’s and VA2’s debit card account information into his/her Venmo app and sent him/herself money via Venmo from their account so s/he could take cash out of the ATM with his/her debit card. The SP stated that s/he “problem solved” and understood that it was “outside the lines” but s/he was “in a bind” and did not get permission from the FM prior to adding VA1’s and VA2’s account information to his/her Venmo app. · After the trip to the bowling alley, VA1’s and VA2’s account information remained on the SP’s Venmo app. The SP “moved money around” between his/her personal accounts via the Venmo app “all the time,” and “accidentally” moved money from VA1’s and VA2’s bank account into his/her Venmo account. The SP stated that s/he did not select or “click” on VA1’s and VA2’s bank card when s/he made the transfers, but that it “defaulted” and “was just the one there.” There were “a lot” of transfers from VA1’s and VA2’s bank account to the SP’s Venmo account before s/he discovered that s/he transferred money from VA1’s and VA2’s bank account instead of his/her own. · The SP stated that s/he repaid “every penny” of VA1’s and VA2’s funds and that it was “made whole.” The SP also stated that s/he took “full responsibility” for what happened and was “terribly sorry” that it happened. Facility documentation showed that the SP was trained on VA1’s and VA2’s support plans, the Client Funds Policy and the Reporting of Maltreatment of Vulnerable Adults Act. Conclusion: A. Maltreatment: Information from all sources was consistent that on ten dates over four months there were unauthorized transfers from VA1’s and VA2’s bank account to the SP’s personal Venmo account that totaled either $1450 or $1550. The SP repaid $1200 which left an unpaid balance of $250 or $350. Given that the FM stated s/he did not authorize the SP to use VA1’s or VA2’s bank account for the ten transfers, there was a preponderance of the evidence that in the absence of legal authority, a person willfully used and/or withheld the funds of VA1 and VA2. It was determined that financial exploitation occurred (in the absence of legal authority a person willfully uses, withholds, or disposes of funds or property of a vulnerable adult). B. Responsibility pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, section 626.557, subdivision 9c, paragraph (c): When determining whether the facility or individual is the responsible party for substantiated maltreatment or whether both the facility and the individual are responsible for substantiated maltreatment, the lead agency shall consider at least the following mitigating factors: (1) whether the actions of the facility or the individual caregivers were in accordance with, and followed the terms of, an erroneous physician order, prescription, resident care plan, or directive. This is not a mitigating factor when the facility or caregiver is responsible for the issuance of the erroneous order, prescription, plan, or directive or knows or should have known of the errors and took no reasonable measures to correct the defect before administering care; (2) the comparative responsibility between the facility, other caregivers, and requirements placed upon the employee, including but not limited to, the facility’s compliance with related regulatory standards and factors such as the adequacy of facility policies and procedures, the adequacy of facility training, the adequacy of an individual’s participation in the training, the adequacy of caregiver supervision, the adequacy of facility staffing levels, and a consideration of the scope of the individual employee’s authority; and (3) whether the facility or individual followed professional standards in exercising professional judgment. The SP was trained on the facility’s Client Funds Policy, the Reporting of Maltreatment of Vulnerable Adults, and VA1’s and VA2’s support plans. Although the SP stated that the transfers were “accidental,” once the SP was aware of the initial transfers that occurred in October 2023 and repaid $300, the SP continued to transfer money from VA1’s and VA2’s account eight more times over three more months and did not take steps to prevent further transfers from occurring. In addition, the SP stated s/he took “full responsibility” for the transfers. The SP was responsible for maltreatment of VA1 and VA2. C. Recurring and/or Serious Maltreatment: The Office of Inspector General is required to evaluate whether substantiated maltreatment by an individual meets the statutory criteria to be determined as “recurring or serious.” Individuals determined to be responsible for recurring or serious maltreatment are disqualified from providing direct contact services. Minnesota Statutes, section 245C.02, subdivision 16, states: “Recurring maltreatment” means more than one incident of maltreatment for which there is a preponderance of evidence that maltreatment occurred and that the subject was responsible for the maltreatment. Minnesota Statutes, section 245C.02, subdivision 18, states: "Serious maltreatment" means sexual abuse, maltreatment resulting in death, neglect resulting in serious injury which reasonably requires the care of a physician whether or not the care of a physician was sought, or abuse resulting in serious injury. For purposes of this definition, "care of a physician" is treatment received or ordered by a physician, physician assistant, or nurse practitioner, but does not include diagnostic testing, assessment, or observation; the application of, recommendation to use, or prescription solely for a remedy that is available over the counter without a prescription; or a prescription solely for a topical antibiotic to treat burns when there is no follow-up appointment. For purposes of this definition, "abuse resulting in serious injury" means: bruises, bites, skin laceration, or tissue damage; fractures; dislocations; evidence of internal injuries; head injuries with loss of consciousness; extensive second-degree or third-degree burns and other burns for which complications are present; extensive second-degree or third-degree frostbite and other frostbite for which complications are present; irreversible mobility or avulsion of teeth; injuries to the eyes; ingestion of foreign substances and objects that are harmful; near drowning; and heat exhaustion or sunstroke. Serious maltreatment includes neglect when it results in criminal sexual conduct against a child or vulnerable adult. It was determined that the substantiated financial exploitation for which the SP was responsible was determined to be recurring maltreatment, because the SP made ten transfers on ten dates from VA1’s and VA2’s bank account to the SP’s personal Venmo account. The substantiated financial exploitation was not determined to be serious, because it did not meet the definition. The SP was disqualified from providing direct contact services. Action Taken by Facility: The facility completed an internal review and determined that policies and procedures were adequate but not followed. The SP no longer worked for the facility. Action Taken by Department of Human Services, Office of Inspector General: The SP was disqualified from a position allowing direct contact with, or access to, persons receiving services from programs, organizations, and/or agencies that are required to have individuals complete a background study by the Department of Human Services as listed in Minnesota Statutes, section 245C.03. The determination that the SP was responsible for maltreatment and the disqualification of the SP are each subject to appeal.
|
